报告人简介：林军，教授，博士生导师，西安交通大学管理科学系主任，智能决策与优化研究所所长，连续5年（2014-2018）入选爱思唯尔（Elsevier）中国高被引学者，入选西安交通大学首批青年拔尖人才支持计划，陕西高校青年创新团队带头人。主要从事“互联网+”商业模式与战略、大数据分析与管理决策、复杂工程与研发项目管理、新产品与互联网平台管理等领域的理论和实践研究。先后发表专著2本、学术期刊论文70余篇，其中SCI、SSCI检索期刊论文35篇。担任工程与技术管理领域顶级期刊IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management和国际学术期刊Journal of Management and Strategy等编委，担任中国管理现代化研究会青年工作委员会副秘书长，中国系统工程学会可持续运营与管理系统分会常务理事，中国系统工程学会青年工作委员会委员。已主持国家自然科学基金项目4项（已结题1项且后评估为优秀），负责国家社科重大子课题一项，参与或主持其他国家级、省部级项目10余项，以第一完成人获陕西省科学技术进步奖二等奖1项、陕西省哲学社会科学优秀成果奖三等奖1项、陕西高等学校人文社会科学研究优秀成果奖一等奖1项、陕西高等学校科学技术奖一等奖1项。

报告简介：Nowadays, subsidy wars among firms for market share frequently happen in markets with network effects. Although such wars are common and costly, research on the subsidy strategies of firms is lacking. We discuss subsidy competition in a duopoly market where the entrant enters the market by subsidizing consumers and the incumbent subsidizes consumers subsequently to maintain its market dominance and maximize its competitive advantage in unit or total subsidy. We show that when the competitive advantage in unit subsidy cost is considered, the incumbent will subsidize consumers after the entrant occupies a certain market share, which is often less than one-fourth. If the competitive advantage in total subsidy cost is considered, then the optimal market share point at which the incumbent starts to subsidize consumers increases with the total subsidy of the entrant. The incumbent cannot keep its market share advantage with less total subsidy when the total subsidy of the entrant exceeds a threshold. The above results hold in general when the firms’ products are differentiated vertically or the horizontal difference between products is small compared to network effects.