报告内容简介：This paper considers equity trading mechanism design for a profit-making intermediary that mediates a seller's asset sale. We first investigate a benchmark model: optimal mediated cash trading mechanism in terms of intermediary’s profit-maximizing objective. And then we fully characterize the intermediary-optimal equity trading mechanisms. In optimal equity trading mechanisms, the seller's asset is allocated to the buyer with the highest value if his virtual value is greater than the seller's virtual value. Moreover, we compare optimal equity trading mechanisms and optimal cash mechanisms, and find that the former outperforms the later in terms of allocation efficiency and the intermediary's expected profit. Lastly, we construct a two-stage equity mediated auction with commission fee to implement the optimal equity trading mechanism. In the optimal mediated equity auction, the intermediary subsidizes the seller to withhold the asset ex post.

报告人简介：王大中，经济学博士，中山大学管理学院专职研究员，研究领域包括博弈论和市场设计。Journal of Mathematical Economics, Mathematical Social Sciences, 《经济研究》、《财经研究》等国内外重要学术期刊发表论文10余篇。